Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports

Stefan Szymanski and Stefan Kesenne

Chapter 7 in The Comparative Economics of Sport, 2010, pp 229-243 from Palgrave Macmillan

Abstract: Abstract This chapter shows that under reasonable conditions, increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.

Keywords: Team Sport; Marginal Revenue; National Football League; Revenue Sharing; Major League Baseball (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Journal Article: Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports (2004)
Working Paper: Competitive balance and gate revenue sharing in team sports (2003)
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DOI: 10.1057/9780230274273_7

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