RAND Journal of Economics

2006 - 2025

Current editor(s): James Hosek

From RAND Corporation
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Signalling and the design of delegated management contracts for public utilities pp. 763-782: David Martimort and Wilfried Sand‐Zantman
Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications pp. 783-798: Pierre Chiappori, Bruno Jullien, Bernard Salanié and François Salanié
Retail electricity competition pp. 799-815: Paul Joskow and Jean Tirole
Screening when some agents are nonstrategic: does a monopoly need to exclude? pp. 816-840: Sergei Severinov and Raymond Deneckere
Spin‐outs: knowledge diffusion through employee mobility pp. 841-860: April Franco and Darren Filson
Submarkets and the evolution of market structure pp. 861-886: Steven Klepper and Peter Thompson
Coordination versus differentiation in a standards war: 56K modems pp. 887-909: Angelique Augereau, Shane Greenstein and Marc Rysman
Dynamic monopoly pricing and herding pp. 910-928: Subir Bose, Gerhard Orosel, Marco Ottaviani and Lise Vesterlund
Social learning and health plan choice pp. 929-945: Alan T. Sorensen
To bundle or not to bundle pp. 946-963: Hanming Fang and Peter Norman
Spatial competition in retail markets: movie theaters pp. 964-982: Peter Davis
Price, quality, and reputation: evidence from an online field experiment pp. 983-1005: Ginger Zhe Jin and Andrew Kato
An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds pp. 1005-1022: Artyom Shneyerov

Profit sharing (with workers) facilitates collusion (among firms) pp. 483-502: Dan Bernhardt and Christopher Chambers
Delegating management to experts pp. 503-520: Chifeng Dai, Tracy Lewis and Giuseppe Lopomo
Internal promotion competitions in firms pp. 521-542: Jed DeVaro
Sales and consumer inventory pp. 543-561: Igal Hendel and Aviv Nevo
The benefits of extended liability pp. 562-582: Yolande Hiriart and David Martimort
Multiproduct Cournot oligopoly pp. 583-601: Justin P. Johnson and David Myatt
The role of firm characteristics in pharmaceutical product launches pp. 602-618: Margaret Kyle
An empirical model of firm entry with endogenous product‐type choices pp. 619-640: Katja Seim
Introduction pp. 643-644: Jean Rochet and Jean Tirole
Two‐sided markets: a progress report pp. 645-667: Jean Rochet and Jean Tirole
Competition in two‐sided markets pp. 668-691: Mark Armstrong
Your network or mine? The economics of routing rules pp. 692-719: Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael Katz
Pricing and commitment by two‐sided platforms pp. 720-737: Andrei Hagiu
Quantifying equilibrium network externalities in the ACH banking industry pp. 738-761: Daniel Ackerberg and Gautam Gowrisankaran

Explaining the distribution of firm growth rates pp. 235-256: Giulio Bottazzi and Angelo Secchi
Using price distributions to estimate search costs pp. 257-275: Han Hong and Matthew Shum
Ownership, incentives, and the hold‐up problem pp. 276-299: Tim Baldenius
Markets, torts, and social inefficiency pp. 300-323: Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
Coordinating on lower prices: pharmaceutical pricing under political pressure pp. 324-340: Sara Fisher Ellison and Catherine Wolfram
Reputation and turnover pp. 341-361: Rafael Rob and Tadashi Sekiguchi
Monopoly with resale pp. 362-375: Giacomo Calzolari and Alessandro Pavan
Optimal incentives for sequential production processes pp. 376-390: Eyal Winter
Budget or target: the choice between input and output strategies pp. 391-415: Nolan H. Miller and Amit I. Pazgal
Store characteristics in retail oligopoly pp. 416-430: Howard Smith
Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability pp. 431-448: Robert Gary‐Bobo and Yossi Spiegel
Price‐matching guarantees pp. 449-465: Sridhar Moorthy and Ralph Winter
Estimating a continuous hedonic‐choice model with an application to demand for soft drinks pp. 466-482: Tat Y. Chan

Partnership dissolution with interdependent values pp. 1-22: Philippe Jehiel and Ady Pauzner
Designing electricity auctions pp. 23-46: Natalia Fabra, Nils‐Henrik Fehr and David Harbord
Predation and its rate of return: the sugar industry, 1887–1914 pp. 47-69: David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin
Sequential auctions: theory and evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange pp. 70-80: Val Lambson and Norman K Thurston
Partial cross ownership and tacit collusion pp. 81-99: David Gilo, Yossi Moshe and Yossi Spiegel
Incentives, wages, and promotions: theory and evidence pp. 100-120: Illoong Kwon
Damaged durable goods pp. 121-133: Jong‐Hee Hahn
Cooperative investments induced by contract law pp. 134-145: Urs Schweizer
Aggressive leaders pp. 146-154: Federico Etro
Reputational cheap talk pp. 155-175: Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sørensen
Best foot forward or best for last in a sequential auction? pp. 176-194: Archishman Chakraborty, Nandini Gupta and Rick Harbaugh
Field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions: more Magic on the Internet pp. 195-211: David Reiley
National versus international mergers in unionized oligopoly pp. 212-233: Kjell Lommerud, Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard