RAND Journal of Economics

2006 - 2025

Current editor(s): James Hosek

From RAND Corporation
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Who gets to the top? Generalists versus specialists in managerial organizations pp. 577-601: Daniel Ferreira and Raaj Sah
The economics of network neutrality pp. 602-629: Nicholas Economides and Benjamin Hermalin
When does a firm disclose product information? pp. 630-649: Frederic Koessler and Régis Renault
Optimal domestic regulation under asymmetric information and international trade: a simple general equilibrium approach pp. 650-676: David Martimort and Thierry Verdier
The market for lawyers and quality layers in legal services pp. 677-704: Elisabetta Iossa and Bruno Jullien
Measuring aggregate productivity growth using plant-level data pp. 705-725: Amil Petrin and James Levinsohn
Endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction pp. 726-760: Viplav Saini
Why payment card fees are biased against retailers pp. 761-780: Julian Wright

A theory of delegated search for the best alternative pp. 391-416: Tracy Lewis
A search cost model of obfuscation pp. 417-441: Glenn Ellison and Alexander Wolitzky
Risk allocation and the costs and benefits of public--private partnerships pp. 442-474: Elisabetta Iossa and David Martimort
Product markets and industry-specific training pp. 475-491: Hans Gersbach and Armin Schmutzler
Colluding through suppliers pp. 492-513: Salvatore Piccolo and Jeanine Miklós-Thal
Payoff uncertainty, bargaining power, and the strategic sequencing of bilateral negotiations pp. 514-536: Silvana Krasteva and Huseyin Yildirim
Price-cap regulation and the scale and timing of investment pp. 537-561: Lewis Evans and Graeme Guthrie
Endogenous market segmentation for lemons pp. 562-576: Kyungmin Kim

The form of incentive contracts: agency with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and limited liability pp. 215-234: Joaquín Poblete and Daniel Spulber
Choosing the rules for consensus standardization pp. 235-252: Joseph Farrell and Timothy Simcoe
An approximate dynamic programming approach to solving dynamic oligopoly models pp. 253-282: Vivek Farias, Denis Saure and Gabriel Y. Weintraub
How much discretion for risk regulators? pp. 283-314: Yolande Hiriart and David Martimort
Consumer-surplus-enhancing collusion and trade pp. 315-328: George Deltas, Alberto Salvo and Helder Vasconcelos
Competition among the big and the small pp. 329-347: Ken-Ichi Shimomura and Jacques Thisse
The great industry gamble: market structure dynamics as a survival contest pp. 348-367: Áron Tóth
fines, leniency, and rewards in antitrust pp. 368-390: Maria Bigoni, Sven-Olof Fridolfsson, Chloe Le Coq and Giancarlo Spagnolo

Competition for attention in the Information (overload) Age pp. 1-25: Simon Anderson and André de Palma
Vertical control of a distribution network—an empirical analysis of magazines pp. 26-50: Stijn Ferrari and Frank Verboven
Accidental death and the rule of joint and several liability pp. 51-77: Daniel Carvell, Janet Currie and W. Bentley Macleod
The role of demand information and monitoring in tacit collusion pp. 78-109: Christian Rojas
A Markov‐perfect equilibrium model of the impacts of price controls on the performance of the pharmaceutical industry pp. 110-138: Darren Filson
Demand shocks, capacity coordination, and industry performance: lessons from an economic laboratory pp. 139-166: Kyle Hampton and Katerina Sherstyuk
The effect of learning by hiring on productivity pp. 167-185: Pierpaolo Parrotta and Dario Pozzoli
New‐vehicle characteristics and the cost of the Corporate Average Fuel Economy standard pp. 186-213: Thomas Klier and Joshua Linn

Exclusive contracts and demand foreclosure pp. 619-638: David Spector
Sequential location games pp. 639-663: Simon Loertscher and Gerd Muehlheusser
Prizes and lemons: procurement of innovation under imperfect commitment pp. 664-680: Wei Ding and Elmar Wolfstetter
Consumer search and dynamic price dispersion: an application to gasoline markets pp. 681-704: Ambarish Chandra and Mariano Tappata
Moral hazard, hold‐up, and the optimal allocation of control rights pp. 705-728: Vijay Yerramilli
An empirical model of search with vertically differentiated products pp. 729-757: Matthijs Wildenbeest
Rewarding improvements: optimal dynamic contracts with subjective evaluation pp. 758-775: Jimmy Chan and Bingyong Zheng
Demand spillovers and market outcomes in the mutual fund industry pp. 776-804: Alessandro Gavazza

Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media pp. 417-443: Dirk Bergemann and Alessandro Bonatti
Oligopolistic markets with sequential search and production cost uncertainty pp. 444-470: Maarten Janssen, Paul Pichler and Simon Weidenholzer
A dynamic model of lawsuit joinder and settlement pp. 471-494: Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem pp. 495-526: Maria Goltsman
Incentives and creativity: evidence from the academic life sciences pp. 527-554: Pierre Azoulay, Joshua Graff Zivin and Gustavo Manso
Secondary markets with changing preferences pp. 555-574: Justin P. Johnson
The roles of reputation and transparency on the behavior of biased experts pp. 575-594: Sylvain Bourjade and Bruno Jullien
Disclosure standards for vertical contracts pp. 595-617: Anil Arya and Brian Mittendorf

Advertising, the matchmaker pp. 205-245: Bharat Anand and Ron Shachar
Dynamic regulation of quality pp. 246-265: Stéphane Auray, Thomas Mariotti and Fabien Moizeau
Automobile replacement: a dynamic structural approach pp. 266-291: Pasquale Schiraldi
Regulatory enforcement with competitive endogenous audit mechanisms pp. 292-312: Scott Gilpatric, Christian Vossler and Michael McKee
Auctions with heterogeneous entry costs pp. 313-336: Diego Moreno and John Wooders
Why do intermediaries divert search? pp. 337-362: Andrei Hagiu and Bruno Jullien
Interconnection among academic journal websites: multilateral versus bilateral interconnection pp. 363-386: Doh-Shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci
Paying for observable luck pp. 387-415: Fabio Feriozzi

Entry and pricing in a differentiated products industry: evidence from the ATM market pp. 1-22: Gautam Gowrisankaran and John Krainer
Competition, cooperation, and corporate culture pp. 23-43: Michael Kosfeld and Ferdinand von Siemens
Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts pp. 44-69: Arijit Mukherjee and Luis Vasconcelos
Direct and indirect knowledge spillovers: the “social network” of open‐source projects pp. 70-91: Chaim Fershtman and Neil Gandal
Directed matching with endogenous Markov probability: clients or competitors? pp. 92-120: Emanuela Ciapanna
Inventories and the automobile market pp. 121-149: Adam Copeland, Wendy Dunn and George Hall
Can herding improve investment decisions? pp. 150-174: Naveen Khanna and Richmond D. Mathews
Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices pp. 175-203: Xun Tang