RAND Journal of Economics

2006 - 2025

Continuation of Bell Journal of Economics and RAND Journal of Economics.

Current editor(s): James Hosek

From RAND Corporation
Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

Access Statistics for this journal.
Is something missing from the series or not right? See the RePEc data check for the archive and series.

Volume 39, issue 4, 2008

Contracting for information under imperfect commitment pp. 905-925

Vijay Krishna and John Morgan

Strategic judgment proofing pp. 926-948

Yeon-Koo Che and Kathryn E. Spier

Entry and regulation: evidence from health care professions pp. 949-972

Catherine Schaumans and Frank Verboven

Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling pp. 973-989

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

Production targets pp. 990-1017

Guillermo Caruana and Liran Einav

Bidding rings and the winner's curse pp. 1018-1041

Ken Hendricks, Robert Porter and Guofu Tan

Price‐increasing competition pp. 1042-1058

Yongmin Chen and Michael Riordan

Specific knowledge and performance measurement pp. 1059-1079

Michael Raith

Trade costs and multimarket collusion pp. 1080-1104

Eric Bond and Constantinos Syropoulos

Entrepreneurs and new ideas pp. 1105-1125

Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti

Volume 39, issue 3, 2008

Academic freedom, private‐sector focus, and the process of innovation pp. 617-635

Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont and Jeremy C. Stein

What changes energy consumption? Prices and public pressures pp. 636-663

Peter C. Reiss and Matthew W. White

Delegation and incentives pp. 664-682

Helmut Bester and Daniel Krähmer

Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion pp. 683-698

Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra and Jakob Rüggeberg

Quantifying the benefits of entry into local phone service pp. 699-730

Nicholas Economides, Katja Seim and V. Viard

An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities pp. 731-746

Jorge Aseff and Hector Chade

Differentiated networks: equilibrium and efficiency pp. 747-769

Rossella Argenziano

Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands pp. 770-789

Rene Kirkegaard and Per Overgaard

Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't already know? The case of Medicare HMOs pp. 790-821

Leemore Dafny and David Dranove

A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination† pp. 822-849

Doh-Shin Jeon and Sjaak Hurkens

Takeovers, market monitoring, and international corporate governance pp. 850-874

Praveen Kumar and Latha Ramchand

Domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare pp. 875-904

Olivier Armantier and Oliver Richard

Volume 39, issue 2, 2008

A theory of factor allocation and plant size pp. 329-351

Thomas Holmes and Matthew Mitchell

Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship pp. 352-377

Pierpaolo Battigalli and Giovanni Maggi

Parallel imports and price controls pp. 378-402

Gene M. Grossman and Edwin Lai

Incentives and invention in universities pp. 403-433

Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman

Optimal rewards in contests pp. 434-451

Chen Cohen, Todd Kaplan and Aner Sela

Durable goods and conformity pp. 452-468

Christopher House and Emre Ozdenoren

Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure pp. 469-490

Arijit Mukherjee

Information feedback in first price auctions pp. 491-508

Ignacio Esponda

Learning by bidding pp. 509-529

Tanjim Hossain

Durable goods and residential demand for energy and water: evidence from a field trial pp. 530-546

Lucas Davis

Search with learning: understanding asymmetric price adjustments pp. 547-564

Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye

Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts pp. 565-585

Anthony Marino and Jan Zabojnik

Short‐term fluctuations in hospital demand: implications for admission, discharge, and discriminatory behavior pp. 586-606

Rajiv Sharma, Miron Stano and Renu Gehring

Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs pp. 607-616

Jeroen Hinloopen and Adriaan Soetevent

Volume 39, issue 1, 2008

Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture pp. 1-19

Raymond Deneckere and Meng‐Yu Liang

Rules of proof, courts, and incentives pp. 20-40

Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet

Industry dynamics with stochastic demand pp. 41-68

James Bergin and Dan Bernhardt

Properties of scoring auctions pp. 69-85

John Asker and Estelle Cantillon

Understanding strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market pp. 86-114

Ali Hortacsu and Steven Puller

Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information pp. 115-143

Yaron Yehezkel

Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices pp. 144-162

Giovanni Dell'ariccia and Robert Marquez

Imperfect competition and quality signalling pp. 163-183

Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum

Efficient partnership dissolution under buy‐sell clauses pp. 184-198

Maria-Angeles de Frutos and Thomas Kittsteiner

Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing pp. 199-213

Roman Inderst

Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing pp. 214-237

Nabil Al‐Najjar, Sandeep Baliga and David Besanko

The value of information and optimal organization pp. 238-265

Sergei Severinov

Information and bargaining in the hold‐up problem pp. 266-282

Stephanie Lau

Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good pp. 283-304

Isabelle Brocas

Status and incentives pp. 305-326

Emmanuelle Auriol and Régis Renault