RAND Journal of Economics
2006 - 2025
Continuation of Bell Journal of Economics and RAND Journal of Economics. Current editor(s): James Hosek From RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC. Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery (). Access Statistics for this journal.
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Volume 40, issue 4, 2009
- Efficiency out of disorder: Contested ownership in incomplete contracts pp. 597-610

- Kurt Annen
- Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation pp. 611-635

- James Bessen and Eric Maskin
- Credible discovery, settlement, and negative expected value suits pp. 636-657

- Warren F. Schwartz and Abraham L. Wickelgren
- Market power, price discrimination, and allocative efficiency in intermediate‐goods markets pp. 658-672

- Roman Inderst and Greg Shaffer
- Rockets and feathers: Understanding asymmetric pricing pp. 673-687

- Mariano Tappata
- Information congestion pp. 688-709

- Simon Anderson and André de Palma
- The strategic timing incentives of commercial radio stations: An empirical analysis using multiple equilibria pp. 710-742

- Andrew Sweeting
- Competition among contests pp. 743-768

- Ghazala Azmat and Marc Möller
Volume 40, issue 3, 2009
- Information and the hold‐up problem pp. 405-423

- Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Katz
- A welfare analysis of spectrum allocation policies pp. 424-454

- Thomas Hazlett and Roberto E. Muñoz
- Avoiding market dominance: product compatibility in markets with network effects pp. 455-485

- Jiawei Chen, Ulrich Doraszelski and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
- Liability insurance under the negligence rule pp. 486-508

- Marie-Cecile Fagart and Claude Fluet
- Influencing the influencers: a theory of strategic diffusion pp. 509-532

- Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal
- Contracting in the shadow of the law pp. 533-557

- Surajeet Chakravarty and W. Bentley Macleod
- Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information pp. 558-581

- Simon Anderson and Régis Renault
- Do retail gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks? The influence of Edgeworth Cycles pp. 582-595

- Michael Noel
Volume 40, issue 2, 2009
- Prominence and consumer search pp. 209-233

- Mark Armstrong, John Vickers and Jidong Zhou
- The ownership of ratings pp. 234-257

- Antoine Faure‐Grimaud, Eloïc Peyrache and Lucía Quesada
- Endogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissions pp. 258-282

- Y. Chiu and Weiwei Weng
- Preferred suppliers in auction markets pp. 283-295

- Roberto Burguet and Martin K. Perry
- Implementing high‐powered contracts to motivate intertemporal effort supply pp. 296-316

- Leon Yang Chu and David Sappington
- Bargaining with imperfect enforcement pp. 317-339

- Lucy White and Mark Williams
- Firm reputation and horizontal integration pp. 340-363

- Hongbin Cai and Ichiro Obara
- Negotiating contract types and contract clauses in the German construction industry during the Third Reich pp. 364-379

- Jochen Streb
- Task assignments and incentives: generalists versus specialists pp. 380-403

- Suraj Prasad
Volume 40, issue 1, 2009
- Price discrimination in input markets pp. 1-19

- Roman Inderst and Tommaso Valletti
- An empirical investigation of the welfare effects of banning wholesale price discrimination pp. 20-46

- Sofia Berto Villas‐Boas
- Managerial hedging, equity ownership, and firm value pp. 47-77

- Viral Acharya and Alberto Bisin
- Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games pp. 78-102

- David Martimort and Lars Stole
- Efficient tournaments within teams pp. 103-119

- Alex Gershkov, Jianpei Li and Paul Schweinzer
- Vertical restraints and horizontal control pp. 120-143

- Robert Innes and Stephen Hamilton
- Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets pp. 144-172

- Praveen Kumar and Nisan Langberg
- Costly participation and heterogeneous preferences in informational committees pp. 173-189

- Hongbin Cai
- Coordination and delay in hierarchies pp. 190-208

- Andrea Patacconi
Volume 39, issue 4, 2008
- Contracting for information under imperfect commitment pp. 905-925

- Vijay Krishna and John Morgan
- Strategic judgment proofing pp. 926-948

- Yeon-Koo Che and Kathryn E. Spier
- Entry and regulation: evidence from health care professions pp. 949-972

- Catherine Schaumans and Frank Verboven
- Communicating quality: a unified model of disclosure and signalling pp. 973-989

- Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
- Production targets pp. 990-1017

- Guillermo Caruana and Liran Einav
- Bidding rings and the winner's curse pp. 1018-1041

- Ken Hendricks, Robert Porter and Guofu Tan
- Price‐increasing competition pp. 1042-1058

- Yongmin Chen and Michael Riordan
- Specific knowledge and performance measurement pp. 1059-1079

- Michael Raith
- Trade costs and multimarket collusion pp. 1080-1104

- Eric Bond and Constantinos Syropoulos
- Entrepreneurs and new ideas pp. 1105-1125

- Bruno Biais and Enrico Perotti
Volume 39, issue 3, 2008
- Academic freedom, private‐sector focus, and the process of innovation pp. 617-635

- Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont and Jeremy C. Stein
- What changes energy consumption? Prices and public pressures pp. 636-663

- Peter C. Reiss and Matthew W. White
- Delegation and incentives pp. 664-682

- Helmut Bester and Daniel Krähmer
- Illinois Walls: how barring indirect purchaser suits facilitates collusion pp. 683-698

- Maarten Pieter Schinkel, Jan Tuinstra and Jakob Rüggeberg
- Quantifying the benefits of entry into local phone service pp. 699-730

- Nicholas Economides, Katja Seim and V. Viard
- An optimal auction with identity‐dependent externalities pp. 731-746

- Jorge Aseff and Hector Chade
- Differentiated networks: equilibrium and efficiency pp. 747-769

- Rossella Argenziano
- Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands pp. 770-789

- Rene Kirkegaard and Per Overgaard
- Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't already know? The case of Medicare HMOs pp. 790-821

- Leemore Dafny and David Dranove
- A retail benchmarking approach to efficient two‐way access pricing: no termination‐based price discrimination† pp. 822-849

- Doh-Shin Jeon and Sjaak Hurkens
- Takeovers, market monitoring, and international corporate governance pp. 850-874

- Praveen Kumar and Latha Ramchand
- Domestic airline alliances and consumer welfare pp. 875-904

- Olivier Armantier and Oliver Richard
Volume 39, issue 2, 2008
- A theory of factor allocation and plant size pp. 329-351

- Thomas Holmes and Matthew Mitchell
- Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship pp. 352-377

- Pierpaolo Battigalli and Giovanni Maggi
- Parallel imports and price controls pp. 378-402

- Gene M. Grossman and Edwin Lai
- Incentives and invention in universities pp. 403-433

- Saul Lach and Mark Schankerman
- Optimal rewards in contests pp. 434-451

- Chen Cohen, Todd Kaplan and Aner Sela
- Durable goods and conformity pp. 452-468

- Christopher House and Emre Ozdenoren
- Sustaining implicit contracts when agents have career concerns: the role of information disclosure pp. 469-490

- Arijit Mukherjee
- Information feedback in first price auctions pp. 491-508

- Ignacio Esponda
- Learning by bidding pp. 509-529

- Tanjim Hossain
- Durable goods and residential demand for energy and water: evidence from a field trial pp. 530-546

- Lucas Davis
- Search with learning: understanding asymmetric price adjustments pp. 547-564

- Huanxing Yang and Lixin Ye
- Work‐related perks, agency problems, and optimal incentive contracts pp. 565-585

- Anthony Marino and Jan Zabojnik
- Short‐term fluctuations in hospital demand: implications for admission, discharge, and discriminatory behavior pp. 586-606

- Rajiv Sharma, Miron Stano and Renu Gehring
- Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs pp. 607-616

- Jeroen Hinloopen and Adriaan Soetevent
Volume 39, issue 1, 2008
- Imperfect durability and the Coase conjecture pp. 1-19

- Raymond Deneckere and Meng‐Yu Liang
- Rules of proof, courts, and incentives pp. 20-40

- Dominique Demougin and Claude Fluet
- Industry dynamics with stochastic demand pp. 41-68

- James Bergin and Dan Bernhardt
- Properties of scoring auctions pp. 69-85

- John Asker and Estelle Cantillon
- Understanding strategic bidding in multi‐unit auctions: a case study of the Texas electricity spot market pp. 86-114

- Ali Hortacsu and Steven Puller
- Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information pp. 115-143

- Yaron Yehezkel
- Can cost increases increase competition? Asymmetric information and equilibrium prices pp. 144-162

- Giovanni Dell'ariccia and Robert Marquez
- Imperfect competition and quality signalling pp. 163-183

- Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum
- Efficient partnership dissolution under buy‐sell clauses pp. 184-198

- Maria-Angeles de Frutos and Thomas Kittsteiner
- Single sourcing versus multiple sourcing pp. 199-213

- Roman Inderst
- Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing pp. 214-237

- Nabil Al‐Najjar, Sandeep Baliga and David Besanko
- The value of information and optimal organization pp. 238-265

- Sergei Severinov
- Information and bargaining in the hold‐up problem pp. 266-282

- Stephanie Lau
- Optimal choice of characteristics for a nonexcludable good pp. 283-304

- Isabelle Brocas
- Status and incentives pp. 305-326

- Emmanuelle Auriol and Régis Renault
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