Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers
Carol McAusland () and
Peter Kuhn ()
Journal of Development Economics, 2011, vol. 95, issue 1, 77-87
We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.
Keywords: Intellectual; property; rights; Development; Brain; drain; International; labor; migration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers (2010)
Working Paper: Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:deveco:v:95:y:2011:i:1:p:77-87
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