Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers

Carol McAusland () and Peter Kuhn

No 15486, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.

JEL-codes: F22 J61 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mig
Note: ITI LS PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published as McAusland, Carol & Kuhn, Peter, 2011. "Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 77-87, May.

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Journal Article: Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers (2011)
Working Paper: Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers (2010)
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