Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers

Carol McAusland () and Peter Kuhn

No 4936, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We introduce international mobility of knowledge workers into a model of Nash equilibrium IPR policy choice among countries. We show that governments have incentives to use IPRs in a bidding war for global talent, resulting in Nash equilibrium IPRs that can be too high, rather than too low, from a global welfare perspective. These incentives become stronger as developing countries grow in size and wealth, thus allowing them to prevent the 'poaching' of their 'brains' by larger, wealthier markets.

Keywords: international labor migration; brain drain; development; intellectual property rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 J6 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mig
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published - published in: Journal of Development Economics, 2011, 95 (1), 77-87

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bidding for brains: Intellectual property rights and the international migration of knowledge workers (2011)
Working Paper: Bidding for Brains: Intellectual Property Rights and the International Migration of Knowledge Workers (2009)
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