Patents as collateral
Bruno Amable,
Jean-Bernard Chatelain and
Kirsten Ralf
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2010, vol. 34, issue 6, 1092-1104
Abstract:
This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.
Keywords: Collateral; Patents; Research; and; development; Credit; rationing; Growth; Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1889(10)00052-7
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Related works:
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:34:y:2010:i:6:p:1092-1104
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control is currently edited by J. Bullard, C. Chiarella, H. Dawid, C. H. Hommes, P. Klein and C. Otrok
More articles in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().