Patents as Collateral

Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Kirsten Ralf and Bruno Amable

EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, 2010, vol. 34, issue 6, 1094-1104

Abstract: This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.

Keywords: Patents; Collateral; Growth; Innovation; Research and Development; Credit rationing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D9 G2 G3 O1 O3 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/71062/1/Patents%20as%20Collateral.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Patents as collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:espost:71062

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters from ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ().