Patents as Collateral

Bruno Amable, Jean-Bernard Chatelain and Kirsten Ralf

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.

Keywords: Collateral; Patents; Research; and; development; Credit; rationing; Growth; Innovation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2010, 34 (6), pp.1092-1104. ⟨10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.004⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Patents as collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00475854

DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2010.03.004

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().