Patents as Collateral

Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Kirsten Ralf and Bruno Amable

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper studies how the assignment of patents as collateral determines the savings of firms and magnifies the effect of innovative rents on investment in research and development (R&D). We analyse the behaviour of innovative firms that face random and lumpy investment opportunities in R&D. High growth rates of innovations, possibly higher than the real rate of interest, may be achieved despite financial constraints. There is an optimal level of publicly funded policy by the patent and trademark office that minimizes the legal uncertainty surrounding patents as collateral and maximizes the growth rate of innovations.

Keywords: Collateral; Patents; Research and Development; Credit rationing; Growth; Innovation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D92 G2 G24 G3 G32 O1 O3 O4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (40)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Patents as collateral (2010)
Journal Article: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
Working Paper: Patents as Collateral (2010)
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