Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment

Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner

Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 3, 236-238

Abstract: Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.

Keywords: Labor; market; experiments; Real; effort; Social; comparison; Wage; schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Working Paper: Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:236-238

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