Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment
Ben Greiner (),
Axel Ockenfels and
Economics Letters, 2011, vol. 111, issue 3, 236-238
Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.
Keywords: Labor; market; experiments; Real; effort; Social; comparison; Wage; schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment (2010)
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