Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment

Ben Greiner, Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner

No 48, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: Without transparency about peer wages in a real effort experiment, a change of wages does not affect performance. With transparency, however, higher paid workers tend to work more accurately, and lower paid workers shirk more under piece rates.

Keywords: labor market experiments; real effort; social comparison; wage schemes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J33 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-03-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-lab
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Downloads: (external link)
https://ockenfels.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/ ... _download/wp0048.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kls:series:0048

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Kiryl Khalmetski ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).