An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

Uwe Kratzsch, Gernot Sieg and Ulrike Stegemann

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 115, issue 3, 473-476

Abstract: Greenhouse gas emissions build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. We identify weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria with full participation in a game of international emission reduction. Treaties are easier to reach for long-lived than for short-lived gases.

Keywords: Global warming; International agreement; Weak renegotiation-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases (2011)
Working Paper: An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:115:y:2012:i:3:p:473-476

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.107

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