An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

Uwe Kratzsch, Gernot Sieg and Ulrike Stegemann

No 11, Economics Department Working Paper Series from Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department

Abstract: This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation- proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.

Keywords: global warming; international agreement; weak renegotiation-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51314/1/663609720.pdf (application/pdf)

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Journal Article: An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases (2012)
Working Paper: An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:tbswps:11

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