An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases

Uwe Kratzsch, Gernot Sieg and Ulrike Stegemann

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper analyzes greenhouse gas emissions that build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. Weakly renegotiation-proof and subgame perfect equilibria in a game of international emission reduction exist if countries put a sufficiently high weight on future payoffs, even though there is a discontinuity in the required discount factor due to the integrity of the number of punishing countries. Treaties are easier to reach if the gas depreciates slowly.

Keywords: global warming; international agreement; weak renegotiation-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F53 H41 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
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Related works:
Journal Article: An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases (2012)
Working Paper: An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:31977

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