Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

Fangfang Tan and Erte Xiao

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 589-591

Abstract: In a prisoner’s dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

Keywords: Social dilemmas; Third party punishment; Cooperation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game (2011)
Working Paper: Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:589-591

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.002

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