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Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game

Fangfang Tan () and Erte Xiao ()

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is a third party independent of the implicated parties who propose the punishment. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, we find an independent third party vetoes not only punishment to the cooperators but punishment to the defectors as well. Compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, both the cooperation rate and the earnings are lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party.

Keywords: Social dilemmas; third party; punishment; cooperation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-12-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-soc
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Related works:
Journal Article: Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game (2012) Downloads
Working Paper: Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game (2011) Downloads
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