Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game
Fangfang Tan () and
Erte Xiao ()
Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on promoting cooperation when antisocial punishment proposals are rare.
Keywords: Social dilemmas; third party; punishment; cooperation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
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Journal Article: Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game (2012)
Working Paper: Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:peer_punishment_with_third_party
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