Peer Punishment with Third-Party Approval in a Social Dilemma Game

Fangfang Tan and Erte Xiao

Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance

Abstract: This paper investigates how punishment promotes cooperation when the punishment enforcer is independent of its proposer. In a prisoner's dilemma experiment, compared with the case when the implicated parties are allowed to punish each other, cooperation is lower when the enforcement of punishment requires approval from an independent third party. Our data show that the independent third party mitigates the severity of punishment and consequently diminishes the effectiveness of punishment on promoting cooperation when antisocial punishment proposals are rare.

Keywords: Social dilemmas; third party; punishment; cooperation; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2011-10
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/Tax-MPG-RPS-2011-16.pdf Full text (original version) (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game (2012)
Working Paper: Peer punishment with third-party approval in a social dilemma game (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mpi:wpaper:peer_punishment_with_third_party

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Hans Mueller ().