A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games

Salvador Barberà () and Anke Gerber

Economics Letters, 2007, vol. 95, issue 1, 85-90

Date: 2007
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165-1765(06)00321-1
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (2015)
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:95:y:2007:i:1:p:85-90

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().