A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barberà () and Anke Gerber

No 248, Working Papers from Barcelona School of Economics

Abstract: In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Keywords: Hedonic Game; Coalition formation; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-12
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Related works:
Journal Article: A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games (2007)
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (2005)
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bge:wpaper:248

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