A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barberà () and Anke Gerber

UFAE and IAE Working Papers from Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)

Abstract: In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Keywords: Hedonic Game; Coalition Formation; Stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2005-12-01
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (2015)
Journal Article: A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games (2007)
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aub:autbar:656.05

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