A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

Salvador Barber� and Anke Gerber
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Salvador Barberà ()

No 238, IEW - Working Papers from Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich

Abstract: In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that �solutions� to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be �resting points� for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

Keywords: Hedonic game; coalition formation; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (2015)
Journal Article: A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games (2007)
Working Paper: A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games (2005)
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