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Donors change both their level and pattern of giving in response to contests among charities

Cary Deck and James Murphy ()

European Economic Review, 2019, vol. 112, issue C, 91-106

Abstract: This paper examines two previously unexplored techniques for increasing charitable giving, both motivated by the contest literature. One is a fixed bonus that is paid to the organization receiving the most donations, akin to an all-pay auction. The other is a raffle-based bonus, akin to a Tullock contest. These two techniques are compared to a one-to-one matching program and a baseline condition in a within-subject laboratory experiment. The results reveal that all three bonus techniques lead to similar increases in donations to organizations eligible for the promotion. However, when only some organizations are eligible for the bonuses, the increases in giving to eligible organizations are primarily driven by a reallocation of donations away from ineligible organizations.

Keywords: Charitable Giving; Contests; All-pay Auction; Donation Matching; Laboratory Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D6 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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