Donors Change Both Their Level and Pattern of Giving in Response to Contests among Charities
Cary Deck and
James Murphy ()
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Cary Deck: University of Alabama
No 2018-06, Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics
This paper examines two previously unexplored techniques for increasing charitable giving, both motivated by the contest literature. One is a fixed bonus that is paid to the organization receiving the most donations, akin to an all-pay auction. The other is a raffle-based bonus, akin to a Tullock contest. These two techniques are compared to a one-to-one matching program and a baseline condition in a within-subject laboratory experiment. The results reveal that all three bonus techniques lead to similar increases in donations to organizations eligible for the promotion. However, when only some organizations are eligible, the increases in giving to eligible organizations are primarily driven by a reallocation of donations away from ineligible organizations.
Keywords: experimental economics; Charitable Giving; Contests; All-pay Auction; Donation Matching; Laboratory Experiment; philanthropy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D6 D7 D9 L3 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-exp and nep-soc
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Published in European Economic Review. 112:91-106
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Journal Article: Donors change both their level and pattern of giving in response to contests among charities (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ala:wpaper:2018-06
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