EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study

Björn Bartling, Florian Engl and Roberto Weber

European Economic Review, 2014, vol. 70, issue C, 512-524

Abstract: This paper studies whether people can avoid punishment by remaining willfully ignorant about possible negative consequences of their actions for others. We employ a laboratory experiment, using modified dictator games, in which a dictator can remain willfully ignorant about the payoff consequences of his decision for a receiver. A third party can punish the dictator after observing the dictator׳s decision and the resulting payoffs. On the one hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished less if their actions lead to unfair outcomes than dictators who reveal the consequences before implementing the same outcome. On the other hand, willfully ignorant dictators are punished more than revealing dictators if their actions lead to fair outcomes. We conclude that willful ignorance can circumvent blame when unfair outcomes result, but that the act of remaining willfully ignorant is itself punished, regardless of the outcome. Models of procedural fairness combining ex ante and ex post fairness qualitatively predict the observed punishment pattern.

Keywords: Willful ignorance; Third party punishment; Dictator game; ex ante and ex post fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (35)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292114001032
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Does Willful Ignorance Deflect Punishment? - An Experimental Study (2013) Downloads
Working Paper: Does willful ignorance deflect punishment? – An experimental study (2013) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:70:y:2014:i:c:p:512-524

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.016

Access Statistics for this article

European Economic Review is currently edited by T.S. Eicher, A. Imrohoroglu, E. Leeper, J. Oechssler and M. Pesendorfer

More articles in European Economic Review from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-23
Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:70:y:2014:i:c:p:512-524