Ambiguity attitudes and self-confirming equilibrium in sequential games
Pierpaolo Battigalli (),
G. Lanzani and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, vol. 115, issue C, 1-29
We consider a game in extensive form recurrently played by agents who are randomly drawn from large populations and matched. We assume that preferences over actions at any information set admit a smooth-ambiguity representation in the sense of Klibanoff et al. (2005), which may induce dynamic inconsistencies. We take this into account in our analysis of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) given players' feedback about the path of play. Battigalli et al. (2015) show that the set of SCE's of a simultaneous-move game with feedback expands as ambiguity aversion increases. We show by example that SCE in a sequential game is not equivalent to SCE applied to the strategic form of such game, and that the previous monotonicity result does not extend to general sequential games. Still, we provide sufficient conditions under which the monotonicity result holds for SCE.
Keywords: Sequential games with feedback; Smooth ambiguity; Self-confirming equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Ambiguity Attitudes and Self-Confirming Equilibrium in Sequential Games (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:115:y:2019:i:c:p:1-29
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