Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment

Alessandra Casella, Jeffrey Da-Ren Guo and Michelle Jiang

Games and Economic Behavior, 2023, vol. 141, issue C, 133-155

Abstract: Under majoritarian election systems, securing the participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is the adoption of Cumulative Voting (CV) in multi-member districts: each voter has as many votes as open positions but can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Historical experiences are promising but also reflect episodes of minority activism. We present the results of a controlled lab experiment that isolates the role of the voting rule from other confounds. Although each voter is treated equally, theory predicts that CV should increase the minority's turnout relative to the majority and the minority's share of seats won. The experimental results strongly support both theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Voting; Turnout; Minority protection; Costly voting; Laboratory experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D7 D72 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment (2021)
Working Paper: Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:141:y:2023:i:c:p:133-155

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.012

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