Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment

Alessandra Casella, Jeffrey Guo and Michelle Jiang

No 16012, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.

Keywords: Voting; Turnout; Minority protection; Laboratory experiments; Costly voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment (2023)
Working Paper: Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment (2021)
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