Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment

Alessandra Casella, Jeffrey Guo and Michelle Jiang

No 28674, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Under majoritarian election systems, securing participation and representation of minorities remains an open problem, made salient in the US by its history of voter suppression. One remedy recommended by the courts is Cumulative Voting (CV): each voter has as many votes as open positions and can cumulate votes on as few candidates as desired. Theory predicts that CV encourages the minority to overcome obstacles to voting: although each voter is treated equally, CV increases minority's turnout relative to the majority, and the minority's share of seats won. A lab experiment based on a costly voting design strongly supports both predictions.

JEL-codes: C92 D7 D72 K16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Published as Alessandra Casella & Jeffrey Da-Ren Guo & Michelle Jiang, 2023. "Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An Experiment.," Games and Economic Behavior, .

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Related works:
Journal Article: Minority turnout and representation under cumulative voting. An experiment (2023)
Working Paper: Minority Turnout and Representation under Cumulative Voting. An experiment (2021)
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