When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation
Daniel Houser (),
Erte Xiao (),
Kevin McCabe () and
Games and Economic Behavior, 2008, vol. 62, issue 2, 509-532
People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both "intentions" and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (76) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
Working Paper: When Punishment Fails: Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non- Cooperation (2005)
Working Paper: When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non- cooperation (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:2:p:509-532
Access Statistics for this article
Games and Economic Behavior is currently edited by E. Kalai
More articles in Games and Economic Behavior from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().