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Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives

Anastasia Danilov, Christine Harbring and Bernd Irlenbusch

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2019, vol. 162, issue C, 120-135

Abstract: We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.

Keywords: Help; Relative rewards; Team incentives; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M52 J33 J41 L23 C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives (2019) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.03.013

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Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization is currently edited by Houser, D. and Puzzello, D.

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