Helping under a Combination of Team and Tournament Incentives

Anastasia Danilov, Bernd Irlenbusch () and Christine Harbring ()
Additional contact information
Bernd Irlenbusch: University of Cologne
Christine Harbring: RWTH Aachen University

No 12267, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study how help can be fostered by means of a team bonus in the presence of rank-order tournaments. In a simple model we combine elements of relative rewards and a team bonus and study their effect on effort, help and sabotage. Quite intuitively the theoretical analysis suggests that team members help less as relative rewards increase. This problem is mitigated by a team bonus that is proportional to the output of the whole team. We compare different parameter constellations of the theoretical benchmark with behavior observed in a one-shot experiment.

Keywords: help; relative rewards; team incentives; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 J33 J41 L23 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hrm and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published - published in: in: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2019, 162, 120-135

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Journal Article: Helping under a combination of team and tournament incentives (2019)
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