‘Hiding behind a small cake’ in a newspaper dictator game

Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2012, vol. 82, issue 1, 82-85

Abstract: We conduct an Internet dictator game experiment in collaboration with the popular German Sunday paper “Welt am Sonntag”, employing a wider and more representative subject pool than standard laboratory experiments. Recipients either knew or did not know the size of the cake distributed by the dictator. We find that, in case of incomplete information, some dictators ‘hide behind the small cake’, supporting the notion that some agents’ second-order beliefs directly enter the social utility function.

Keywords: Dictator game; Psychological games; Incomplete information; Newspaper experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:82:y:2012:i:1:p:82-85

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.12.008

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