The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

Anastasia Danilov, Torsten Biemann, Thorn Kring and Dirk Sliwka

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2013, vol. 93, issue C, 266-272

Abstract: In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on the recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, inferior products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.

Keywords: Deception; Team incentives; Experiment; Financial advice; Misadvising; Sender-receiver game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D82 G20 J30 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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Working Paper: The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:93:y:2013:i:c:p:266-272

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.012

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