Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence
Stefano Lovo and
Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, vol. 146, issue 5, 1770-1795
We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009)  to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.
Keywords: Repeated; game; with; incomplete; information; Harsanyi; doctrine; Belief-free; equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2011)
Working Paper: Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1770-1795
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