Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

Stefano Lovo, Johannes Hörner and Tristan Tomala

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Abstract: We generalize the results of Hörner and Lovo (2009) [15] to N-player games with arbitrary information structure. First, we characterize the set of belief-free equilibrium payoffs under low discounting as the set of feasible payoffs that are individually rational, jointly rational, and incentive compatible. Second, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty.

Keywords: Repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; Belief-free equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2011, 146 (5), pp.1770-1795. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence (2011)
Working Paper: Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00630299

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.001

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