Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala and Johannes Hörner

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.

Keywords: Repeated games with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; Belief-free equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-11-03
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Published in 2008

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Related works:
Journal Article: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence (2011)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2011)
Working Paper: Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2009)
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