Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence

Stefano Lovo, Tristan Tomala and Johannes Hörner

No 921, HEC Research Papers Series from HEC Paris

Abstract: In this paper, the authors characterize belief-free equilibria in infinitely repeated games with incomplete information with N \ge 2 players and arbitrary information structures. This characterization involves a new type of individual rational constraint linking the lowest equilibrium payoffs across players. The characterization is tight: we define a set of payoffs that contains all the belief-free equilibrium payoffs; conversely, any point in the interior of this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoff vector when players are sufficiently patient. Further, we provide necessary conditions and sufficient conditions on the information structure for this set to be non-empty, both for the case of known-own payoffs, and for arbitrary payoffs.

Keywords: repeated game with incomplete information; Harsanyi doctrine; belief-free equilibria (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 79 pages
Date: 2009-10-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: Characterization and existence (2011)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2011)
Working Paper: Belief-free Equilibria in Games with Incomplete Information: Characterization and Existence (2009)
Working Paper: Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebg:heccah:0921

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