A game of hide and seek in networks

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubiński

Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, vol. 190, issue C

Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

Keywords: Network design; Hide and seek; Covert organizations; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 D85 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:190:y:2020:i:c:s0022053120301125

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119

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