A game of hide and seek in networks
Francis Bloch,
Bhaskar Dutta and
Marcin Dziubinski
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.03132 Latest version (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020) 
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:2001.03132
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().