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A game of hide and seek in networks

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubinski

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2001.03132 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019) Downloads
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