A game of hide and seek in networks

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubiński
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Marcin Dziubiński: UW - Uniwersytet Warszawski [Polska] = University of Warsaw [Poland] = Université de Varsovie [Pologne]

PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) from HAL

Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

Keywords: Network design; Hide and seek; Covert organizations; Networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 190, pp.105119. ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03230063

DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105119

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