A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubi´nski ()
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Marcin Dziubi´nski: Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw

No 21, Working Papers from Ashoka University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

Keywords: Hide; and; Seek; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2019-10-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-mic
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https://dp.ashoka.edu.in/ash/wpaper/paper21_0.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ash:wpaper:21

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