A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks

Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta and Marcin Dziubinski
Additional contact information
Marcin Dziubinski: Institute of Informatics, University of Warsaw

CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA

Abstract: We propose and study a strategic model of hiding in a network, where the network designer chooses the links and his position in the network facing the seeker who inspects and disrupts the network. We characterize optimal networks for the hider, as well as equilibrium hiding and seeking strategies on these networks. We show that optimal networks are either equivalent to cycles or variants of a core-periphery networks where every node in the periphery is connected to a single node in the core.

Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/c ... _-_bhaskar_dutta.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A game of hide and seek in networks (2020)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019)
Working Paper: A Game of Hide and Seek in Networks (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:wcreta:53

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CRETA Online Discussion Paper Series from Centre for Research in Economic Theory and its Applications CRETA Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margaret Nash ().