Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace

Robert Dur, Arjan Non and Hein Roelfsema ()

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2010, vol. 31, issue 4, 676-686

Abstract: We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Social; exchange; Incentive; contracts; Double; moral-hazard; GSOEP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (50)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-4870(10)00067-X
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
Working Paper: Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace (2010)
Working Paper: Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace (2009)
Working Paper: Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:676-686

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Economic Psychology is currently edited by G. Antonides and D. Read

More articles in Journal of Economic Psychology from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().