Deterministic versus probabilistic consequences of trust and trustworthiness: An experimental investigation

Werner Güth (), Harriet Mugera, Andrew Musau and Matteo Ploner

Journal of Economic Psychology, 2014, vol. 42, issue C, 28-40

Abstract: There is overwhelming evidence of reciprocal behavior, driven by intentions. However, the role of consequences is less clear cut. Experimentally manipulating how efficient trust and reciprocity can be in deterministic and uncertain environments allows us to study how payoff consequences of trust and trustworthiness affect reciprocity. According to the results for our modified Investment Game, trustees reward trust more when trust is more efficient but do not adjust rewards when the efficiency of rewarding is varied. Furthermore, higher deterministic benefits result in higher levels of reciprocity for all trust levels, whereas an uncertain environment diminishes reciprocity.

Keywords: Trust and reciprocity; Consequences; Other-regarding preferences; Uncertainty; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Intentions and Consequences An Experimental Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity Determinants (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:42:y:2014:i:c:p:28-40

DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2013.11.003

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