Intentions and Consequences An Experimental Investigation of Trust and Reciprocity Determinants

Werner Güth (gueth@coll.mpg.de), Harriet Mugera, Andrew Musau and Matteo Ploner
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Harriet Mugera: School of Social Sciences, University of Trento, Italy

No 2012-029, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We experimentally manipulate the efficiency of trust and reciprocity in a modified Investment Game. The aim of our manipulation is to test whether reciprocity is mainly affected by payoff consequences of trust or by intentions underlying it. We find that intentions matter and that consequences have an asymmetric impact: trustees reward trust more when trust is more efficient but do not adjust rewards to the efficiency of their own actions. As a result, profitability of trust is fostered by efficiency of trust as well as by efficiency of reciprocity. However, trustors do not fully exploit the high efficiency gains offered by investments and display only moderate trust.

Keywords: trust and reciprocity; other-regarding preference; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-06-20
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Related works:
Journal Article: Deterministic versus probabilistic consequences of trust and trustworthiness: An experimental investigation (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-029

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