How can Bill and Melinda Gates increase other people's donations to fund public goods?

Dean Karlan and John List

Journal of Public Economics, 2020, vol. 191, issue C

Abstract: We conducted a fundraising experiment with an international development nonprofit organization in which a matching grant offered by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation raised more funds than one from an anonymous donor. The effect is strongest for solicitees who previously gave to other BMGF-supported, poverty charities. With supporting evidence from two other fundraising experiments as well as a survey experiment, we argue this is consistent with a quality signal mechanism. Alternative mechanisms are discussed, and not ruled out. The results help inform theories about charitable giving decision-making, and provide guidance to organizations and large donors on how to overcome information asymmetries hindering fundraising.

Keywords: Public goods; Charitable fundraising; Asymmetric information; Matching grant (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D12 D71 D82 H41 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Related works:
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2016)
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2012)
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2012)
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:191:y:2020:i:c:s0047272720301602

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104296

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