How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods?

Dean Karlan and John List

No 17954, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We conducted a fundraising experiment with an international development nonprofit organization in which a matching grant offered by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation raised more funds than one from an anonymous donor. The effect is strongest for solicitees who previously gave to other BMGF-supported, poverty charities. With supporting evidence from two other fundraising experiments as well as a survey experiment, we argue this is consistent with a quality signal mechanism. Alternative mechanisms are discussed, and not ruled out. The results help inform theories about charitable giving decision-making, and provide guidance to organizations and large donors on how to overcome information asymmetries hindering fundraising.

JEL-codes: C93 D64 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-03
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (21)

Published as Dean Karlan & John A. List, 2020. "How can Bill and Melinda Gates increase other people's donations to fund public goods?," Journal of Public Economics, vol 191.

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Related works:
Journal Article: How can Bill and Melinda Gates increase other people's donations to fund public goods? (2020)
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2016)
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2012)
Working Paper: How Can Bill and Melinda Gates Increase Other People's Donations to Fund Public Goods? (2012)
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