Equilibrium selection in signaling games with teams: Forward induction or faster adaptive learning?

David Cooper () and John Kagel

Research in Economics, 2009, vol. 63, issue 4, 216-224

Abstract: Teams are shown to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements in signaling games: single-round deletion of dominated strategies (part of the Cho-Kreps intuitive criteria). This is important because, to the extent that teams can be easily induced to violate the most basic of equilibrium refinements even under a "best case" scenario (teams that rapidly develop strategic play in games of this sort), it implies that one must rely on learning models, and past empirical research with these models, when predicting equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords: Teams; Signaling; games; Equilibrium; refinements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1090-9443(09)00041-6
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:reecon:v:63:y:2009:i:4:p:216-224

Access Statistics for this article

Research in Economics is currently edited by Federico Etro

More articles in Research in Economics from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().